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COMMENT
IS IT TOO LATE FOR JUVENILE CURFEWS?
QUTB LOGIC AND THE CONSTITUTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Juvenile crime has risen dramatically in recent times. As a result,
local governments have again turned to juvenile curfews to fight the
infestation of drugs and violent crime. Although curfews have been
struck down as unconstitutional,' the Fifth Circuit has recently ruled that
a narrowly tailored curfew for Dallas, Texas survived constitutional
scrutiny.2 Consequently, many cities have begun implementing juvenile
curfews mirroring the Dallas ordinance.3 These cities, however, should
tread carefully before adopting wholesale the Dallas curfew. As this
Comment demonstrates, the Fifth Circuit's rationale contains some problems, and therefore, the constitutionality of such curfews may still be in
question.
Part II of this Comment briefly traces the use of curfews through
history from feudal times to the present. Part ImI reviews the jurisprudence surrounding the constitutionality of juvenile curfews. Part IV
gives a brief overview of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Qutb v. Strauss.4
In Part V, this Comment identifies and examines some of the problems
with the Qutb rationale. More specifically, this Part analyzes the Fifth
Circuit's dismissal of the factors prescribed by the Supreme Court in
Bellotti v. Baird.' Finally, Part VI describes the reaction to the Qutb
ruling and discusses some potential concerns with curfews in general.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra notes 69-119 and accompanying text.
See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
See infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
11 F.3d at 488.
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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HISTORY OF CURFEWS

The word "curfew" can be traced to the old French expression
"couvrefeu," which means "cover-fire." 6 In feudal times, it was customary to ring a bell each evening as "a signal to put out fires and go to
bed."7 In 1068, William the Conqueror strictly enforced a curfew in
England which commenced at 8:00 p.m. and required the English to be
off the streets or away from a particular area to prevent gatherings.' This
curfew proved so unpopular that it was repealed in 1103 by William's
son Henry iV In the United States, many southern towns, prior to the
Civil War, used curfews to indicate times at which slaves were required
to be off the streets."

Throughout the years, curfews have been used in a variety of
circumstances: to maintain peace in emergencies," to limit public park

6. BREWER'S DICTIONARY OF PHRASE & FABLE 289 (Ivor H. Evans ed., 1970).

7. Id. "[D]uring the reign of Alfred there was an ordinance that Oxford inhabitants should
retire at the tolling of a curfew bell ... ." Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204 A.2d 688, 690 (Md.
1964); see also 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 330 (Grolier Int'l ed., 1995) ("In England the custom
[of extinguishing fires when the evening bell was rung] probably dates back to the time of Alfred
the Great (reigned 871-899), and it was common in most of Europe as well."); 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 903 (1971) (curfews originated from the fear of fires during a time when cities were
built of timber).
8. See Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 690; see also BREVER'S DICTIONARY OF PHRASE & FABLE,
supra note 6, at 289; 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, supra note 7, at 330.
9. See BLACK'S LAW DICTnONARY 381 (6th ed. 1990).
10. See 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 306 (Grolier ed., 1957).
11. See United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1283 (4th Cir. 1971) (upholding a curfew
imposed as a result of a riot between police and African-American high school students); see also
People v. McKelvy, 100 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (Ct. App. 1972) (declaring that a "clear showing of
emergent necessity" engendered by race riots justified imposition of a curfew); Davis v. Justice
Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 409, 414 (Ct. App. 1970) (upholding a curfew imposed over a housing project
in which riotous conditions existed); State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920, 925 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967)
(upholding curfew where property destruction and riotous conditions threatened the city's general
welfare); Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556, 559-60 (D.C. 1969) (upholding a curfew
barring all persons except police, firefighters, medical personnel, and sanitation workers from the
streets as a reasonable and usual police regulation in response to serious disorder throughout the
city); Municipal Court v. Patrick, 254 So. 2d 193, 194-95 (Fla. 1971) (invalidating a mayor's curfew
issuance because the power to issue curfews during times of emergency belonged to the City
Commission); Walsh v. City of River Rouge, 189 N.W.2d 318, 326 (Mich. 1971) (holding that in
times of civil disorder and riot the city may not issue curfews absent an action by the governor,
because state action preempts city action in such circumstances); State v. Dobbins, 178 S.E.2d 449,
456-59 (N.C. 1971) (upholding an emergency curfew ordinance as a valid use of the state's police
power when the city faced imminent threat of widespread burning and other destruction to public
and private property); Ervin v. State, 163 N.W.2d 207, 210-11 (Wis. 1968) (upholding a municipal
curfew imposed to restore order after the outbreak of local riots).
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operating hours, 2 to keep vagrants off the streets, 3 and to provide for
national security during wartime. 4 Currently, a curfew is recognized as

"[a] law (commonly an ordinance) which imposes on people (particularly
children) the obligation to remove
themselves from the streets on or
15
night."'
of
time
certain
a
before
Juvenile curfews first received substantial support in the latter
portion of the nineteenth century. 6 President Benjamin Harrison called

the curfew "'the most important municipal regulation for the protection
of the children of American homes, from the vices of the street.'"17 At
the National Convention of the Boys and Girls Home Employment
Association in 1884, Colonel Alexander Hogeland, known as "'the Father
of the curfew law,"' urged the adoption of curfew ordinances. 8

12. See Peters v. Breier, 322 F. Supp. 1171, 1171-72 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (upholding a curfew
ordinance because it restricted use of a carefully defined area (a park) during specified hours,
provided appropriate notice, and applied to all persons indiscriminately); see also People v.
Trantham, 208 Cal. Rptr. 535, 544 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that a city ordinance
prohibiting a person from entering, remaining, staying, or loitering in a public park between the
hours of 10:30 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. was not overbroad or vague); Chicago Park Dist. v. Altman, 262
N.E.2d 373, 374 (Il1. App. Ct. 1970) (holding that a "regulation limiting use of the parks between
11:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M. is a reasonable exercise of the Park District's powers"); People v. Zalon,
145 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270-71 (Magis. Ct. 1955) (holding that a park department regulation prohibiting
persons from loitering or remaining in parks between midnight and one-half hour before sunrise did
not unconstitutionally infringe upon one's civil liberties); State v. Allred, 204 S.E.2d 214, 218-19
(N.C. Ct. App.) (holding that imposing a curfew on a park during a state of emergency was a valid
use of the state's police power), appeal dismissed, 205 S.E.2d 724 (N.C. 1974).
13. See Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 F. 93, 96-97 (9th Cir. 1916) (upholding a city ordinance
defining vagrants as all persons without known employment found wandering on the street after
11:00 p.m.); cf. Ruffv. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303, 305 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (invalidating as overbroad
a curfew ordinance restricting loitering upon any public place of business after business hours); City
of Shreveport v. Brewer, 72 So. 2d 308, 309-10 (La. 1954) (invalidating for vagueness an ordinance
providing penalties for people "[w]ho shall be on the streets of the City after midnight without a
satisfactory explanation"); City of Portland v. James, 444 P.2d 554, 556 (Or. 1968) (in bane)
(invalidating for vagueness an ordinance making it unlawful for "any person to roam or be upon any
street, alley or public place, without having and disclosing a lawful purpose" between 1 a.m. and 5
a.m.).

14. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93-105 (1943) (validating war power curfew
regulations created under an executive order imposed upon all persons of Japanese ancestry in
military areas during World War II); Exparte Ventura, 44 F. Supp. 520, 523 (W.D. Wash. 1942)
(upholding a restriction on movement of American-born citizens of Japanese ancestry in critical
military areas essential for national defense during World War II).
15. BLACK'S LAWv DICTIoNARY 381 (6th ed. 1990).
16. See H.L. & R.RO., Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile
Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 66, 66-67 n.5 (1958) (citing 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 306 (Grolier
ed., 3d ed. 1925)).
17. Id. (quoting 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, supra note 16, at 306).
18. Id.
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Hogeland's recommendation was widely supported.' 9
During the late 1800s, urban juvenile crime was often attributed to

a lack of parental responsibility, thought to exist chiefly in
numbers of immigrant families entering into the United
Curfews were intended to impose parental responsibility
immigrant families, in an attempt to curb unwholesome

the large
States.20
on these
juvenile

activity." By the turn of the century, approximately three thousand
juvenile curfew ordinances were enacted in municipalities across the
country.'
From the beginning of the twentieth century until the Second World
War, the interest in juvenile curfews waned.2 3 However, the outbreak
of war led to a resurgence in the use of these curfews.2 4 After World
War II, juvenile curfews were still widely used to fight the perceived
increase in juvenile crime.25 In the 1960s and 1970s, an "increase' in
social problems resulted in a "spate" of curfew laws being enacted
26
around the country.
In recent years, the use of juvenile curfews has again become
"[p]erhaps the most popular local fad." 27 State legislatures around the
country have resorted to curfews to fight the perceived national epidemic

19. See Mrs. John D. Townsend, Curfew for City Children, 163 N. AM. REv. 725, 728 (1896)
("In June, 1896, I received a statement announcing that two hundred cities had adopted the Curfew,
and that city officials, parents, school teachers, employers of youthful labor, and especially chiefs
of police were emphatic in their praise of its efficacy.'). But see Winifred Buck, Objections to a
Children's Curfew, 164 N. AM. REv. 381, 382 (1897) (stating that it would be "almost impossible
to enforce [a curfew] without at once breeding more of the crime it is supposed to prevent").
20. See Townsend, supra note 19, at 725.
21. See id. at 725-26.
22. See 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, supra note 10, at 306.
23. See MUNICIPALITmES AND THE LAW IN ACTION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1943 WAR
CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNICIPAL LAW OFFICERS 58 (Charles S. Rhyne ed.,
1944).
24. See H.L. & R.R.O, supra note 16, at 66-67 n.5. "With parents in the armed forces or
working in war industries, often on night shifts, and with the influx of servicemen into urban areas,
control of juveniles became an increasingly difficult task. Resultant wartime curfews attempted to
prevent juveniles from roaming the streets or loitering in public places." Id.
25. See id. at 66-67.
26. See ROBERT H. MNOoIuN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 1017
(Little, Brown & Co. 3d ed. 1995) (social problems including drugs and increased crime).
27. After Dark, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 1994, at 25; see also Sue Anne Pressley, Nightly Youth
Curfews: ClampingDown Across America, WASH. POST, July 13, 1994, at Al ("In the span of less
than five years, officials in nearly 1,000 jurisdictions across America... have chosen the
controversial method [(juvenile curfews)] as a way of fighting fear with formal action, of trying to
regain some measure of control over a society where family values seem to be slipping.").
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of illegal drugs,2" gang activity,2 9 and increased juvenile crime.3"

mH.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JUVENILE CURFEWS

The first United States case to hold a juvenile curfew ordinance
unconstitutional was Ex ParteMcCarver.3 The court held:
The rule laid down here is as rigid as under military law, and makes
the tolling of the curfew bell equivalent to the drum taps of the camp.
In our opinion, it is an undue invasion of the personal liberty of the
citizen, as the boy or girl... have the same
rights of ingress and
32

egress that citizens of mature years enjoy.

Judicial evaluation of juvenile curfews in the mid-1900s turned on the
distinction between loitering and the mere presence of minors engaged
in lawful pursuits on the streets.33 Under this presence/loitering distinction, some courts deemed it unconstitutional to proscribe the presence of
a juvenile in public.34 On the other hand, if the juvenile's presence
resulted in that individual remaining at a location for an extended period
of time, then the juvenile's activity could be restricted. 35 In actual
practice, however, the presence/loitering distinction did not make a
difference in the enforcement of the juvenile curfew ordinances; police

28. See Michael Jordan, From the Constitutionality of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances to a
Children'sAgenda for the 1990s: Is It Really a Simple Matter of Supporting Family Values and
Recognizing FundamentalRights?, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 389, 390-91 (1993).
29. See Note, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76 MICH. L. REv. 109, 111
(1977).
30. See Gary Peter Klahr, The Legal War on the Young Continues, ARiz. ATr'y, July 1994,
at 15, 18.
[Clurfew ordinances have received new attention in recent months because of the wave
of juvenile crime. Many cities feel that enactment of a juvenile curfew is an easy way to
clear the streets of troublesome juveniles and to protect adventuresome juveniles from
being injured by other juveniles or young adults.
Id.
31. 46 S.W. 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898); see also In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368, 373 (Ohio
Ct. C.P. 1978).
32. McCarver, 46 S.W. at 937.
33. See Alves v. Justice Court, 306 P.2d 601, 605 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); see also People
v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 500, 502 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945) (considering the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew for the second time in U.S. history); Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 204
A.2d 688, 691 (Md. 1964); City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966);
City of Portland v. James, 444 P.2d 554, 555-57 (Or. 1968) (in banc) (holding a curfew ordinance
void for vagueness when it makes criminal the mere presence of a person on the street rather than
being on the street with a purpose to commit a specific crime); Mosier, 394 N.E.2d at 373.
34. See Alves, 306 P.2d at 605; see also Mosier,394 N.E.2d at 376.
35. See H.L. & R.RO., supra note 16, at 99.
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acting under the "loitering" type curfew enforced it as if it was a
36
"presence" type curfew.
While some courts have retained the presence/loitering distinc-

tion,37 other courts, during the mid-1970s, abandoned this distinction

and turned to a liberty interest approach. Under this new approach, courts
focused on whether the ordinance curtailed juveniles' liberty interests.38
There were two factors that led courts to adopt this new approach. First,
"[t]he Supreme Court began to specify the areas of a minor's life which
could not be subject[ed] to intrusive state regulation."39 Second, the
Court "delineated procedural protections which must be extended to

minors even when the State could lawfully subject a minor to state
40

control.
Under the liberty interest approach to analyzing juvenile curfews, a
small number of courts have found the curfew ordinances constitutional.4 ' The Illinois Supreme Court was one of the first state courts to find
a juvenile curfew constitutional under this liberty interest rationale.4 2 In
People v. Chambers, the court held that when the state legislates for the

benefit of its children, it is not required "to proceed upon the assumption
that minor children have an absolutely unlimited right not only to choose

36. See id. at 73; see also Jordan, supra note 28, at 398 (noting that "this initial attempt to
define the constitutionality of juvenile curfew statutes rested upon a distinction between types of
conduct that in reality may not have existed, and if they did, were often too subtle to discern by
police officers charged with enforcing the ordinance").
37. See In re Daniel W., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202, 205-06 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding a curfew
that proscribed loitering rather than mere presence); see also In re Frank 0., 247 Cal. Rptr. 655 (Ct.
App. 1988) (holding a curfew void for vagueness for failing to provide fair notice of what was
forbidden conduct); Hendrickson v. Nancy C. (In re Nancy C.), 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 119-20 (Ct. App.
1972) (upholding a loitering-type juvenile curfew ordinance).
38. See Jordan, supra note 28, at 398.
39. Id. Professor Jordan cites to numerous cases in which the United States Supreme Court
held that states may not constitutionally legislate against the liberty interests of minors. See Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding that a state may not have a per se rule requiring parental
consent before a minor can have an abortion); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (requiring notice
and hearing prior to suspending a student from school); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in adjudications involving juvenile delinquents); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (protecting students' First
Amendment right to free speech during school).
40. Jordan, supra note 28, at 398.
41. See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072, 1074 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); see
also McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984); City of Maquoketa v.
Russell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Iowa 1992); Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental
Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1984) [hereinafter
Assessing Minors' Rights].
42. See People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55, 57-58 (Ill. 1976).
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their own associates, but also to decide when and where they will asso'
ciate with them."43
The decision in Chambers came two years before Bellotti v.
Baird,4 in which the Court identified three factors for courts to consider in determining whether minors' rights are equal to those of adults.45
Bellotti involved a Massachusetts statute that required an unmarried
woman under the age of eighteen to obtain parental consent before an
abortion could be performed.46 If one or both parents refused to
consent, an abortion could only be performed if "good cause" was shown
to a superior court judge.4 7 In finding the statute unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court's plurality decision articulated a framework to determine
when a state may give less deference to the constitutional rights of
minors than to those of adults.4 8 The three crucial factors found by the
Court were: "[1.] the peculiar vulnerability of children; [2.] their inability
to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and [3.] the
importance of the parental role in child rearing."' 9
In 1990, an Illinois appellate court revisited the juvenile curfew
question and, in doing so, discussed the three Bellotti factors. 50 The
court found that two of the Bellotti factors were applicable. 5 In analyzing these factors, the court relied heavily upon the Chambers' decision.5 2 The problem with the court's rationale, however, is that in attempting to remain true to precedent, the court attempted to fit the old
Chambers' rationale into the Bellotti factors.5 3
43. Id. at 57.
44. 443 U.S. at 622.
45. See id. at 634.
46. See id. at 625-26.
47. See id.
48. See id.
at 634.
49. Id.
50. See Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12, 16-17 (IlL. App. Ct. 1990).
51. See id. at 16. The court stated that "[tlhe thrust of the defendant's ambiguous argument
appears to be that, in order for the curfew ordinance to be constitutionally permissible as applied to
minors, one of the three reasons outlined in Bellotti must be present in order to justify the
ordinance." Id.
52. See id. at 16-17.
53. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. In discussing the application of the first
Bellotti factor, justification for the curfew as a protection for children, the Greenberg court held:
"The statute proceeds upon the basic assumption that when a child is at home during the
late night and early morning hours, it is protected from physical as well as moral dangers.
Although there are instances, unfortunately, in which this assumption is untrue, we are
satisfied that the State is justified in acting upon it.
In legislating for the welfare of its children, the State is not required, in our
opinion, to proceed upon the assumption that minor children have an absolutely unlimited
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also addressed the constitutional-

4
ity of a juvenile curfew and found that it passed constitutional muster.1

The court acknowledged that the fundamental rights of juveniles were
impinged upon by the curfew ordinance,55 but held that the ordinance
was not overly broad since the state has greater authority to regulate the
activities of children. 6 The court reasoned that the state interest in
protecting youths and curtailing juvenile crime was compelling and that
the ordinance was narrowly drawn. 7
The Colorado Supreme Court similarly held that a juvenile curfew

was constitutional.58 The court concluded that the juveniles' interest in
freedom of movement was not a fundamental right. Consequently, the
court applied a rational basis test and held that the curfew was drawn
carefully enough as to not infringe upon the liberty interest of minors. 9
The Iowa Supreme Court found that only a rational basis test
applied to its juvenile curfew ordinance.6" The court held that "a

right not only to choose their own associates, but also to decide when and where they
will associate with them. Recognition of such a right would require wholesale revision
of the large body of law that relates to guardian and ward, parent and child, and minors
generally. Compulsary [sic] school attendance would be prohibited. A child is carefully
safeguarded against errors of choice and judgment in most of the ordinary affairs of life,
and we see no constitutional impairment in the limited restriction upon the child's
judgment that is involved in this statute."
550 N.E.2d at 16 (quoting People v. Chambers, 360 N.E.2d 55, 57-58 (ill. 1976)). The Greenberg
court also addressed the manner in which curfew statutes affect the parental role in child rearing:
"By providing a sanction against the parent who knowingly permits a child to
violate the statute, the cooperation of the parent is commanded. That sanction may also
operate indirectly to enlist cooperation from the child, who may be willing to risk getting
into trouble himself, but unwilling to involve his parents in a violation of the law.
Parental control is thereby strengthened"
Id. at 16-17 (quoting Chambers, 360 N.E.2d at 58).
54. See City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329, 338-39 (Wis. 1988).
55. See id. at 337.
56. See id. at 339. The court explained the concept of overbreadth as follows:
"A statute is overbroad when its language, given its normal meaning, is so sweeping that
its sanctions may be applied to constitutionally protected conduct which the state is not
permitted to regulate. The essential vice of an overbroad law is that by sweeping
protected activity within its reach it deters citizens from exercising their protected
constitutional freedoms, the so-called 'chilling effect."'
Id. at 336 (citation omitted) (quoting Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Wis. 1987)).
57. See id. at 339. The court did not address the question of vagueness, holding that
"appellants do not have standing to challenge the ordinance as unconstitutionally vague." Id. at 33536.
58. See In re J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 224 (Colo. 1989) (en banc).
59. See id at 223-24. The court also held that the question regarding the statute being
overbroad could not be addressed because J.M. lacked standing. See id. at 224.
60. See City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 369 (Iowa 1989).
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minor's right of intracity travel is not a fundamental right for due process
purposes. 61 The court, in applying a rational basis test, determined that
the ordinance was constitutional as a "reasonable exercise of the City's
power to legislate for the good of its citizens."'62 The Iowa court, in
making its decision, relied in part on the decision rendered by the United
States district court in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown.'3
Bykofsky represents the first time a federal court addressed the issue
of juvenile curfews.' The district court acknowledged that the curfew,
if applied to adults, would amount to an infringement of their fundamental rights, but found that the borough's interest in protecting the safety
of children and the community outweighed the liberty interests of
minors. The court decided that the liberty interest of minors involved
was not fundamental and used a rational basis test to conclude that the
age classification was reasonably related to the government's stated
purpose. 6 The rational basis test has not been used by any other federal
court in analyzing juvenile curfews and is rarely used by state courts.6'
Furthermore, Bykofsky's use of it has been criticized. 8
Despite the few cases where curfews have been found constitutional,
many courts have held juvenile curfews to be unconstitutional. In 1973,
the Hawaii Supreme Court, upon reviewing a curfew, found that minors'
rights deserved the same protection as adults and therefore held that a
Honolulu curfew prohibiting loitering by juveniles at night was so vague
and overbroad that it violated due process standards. 69 In the same year,

61. Id.

62. Id.
63. 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976).
64. See id. at 1245.

65. See id. at 1256-58.
66. See id. at 1265.
67. See Peter L. Scherr, Note, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance:In Search of a New Standard
of Review, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 163, 187 (1992).
68. See Assessing Minors' Rights, supranote 41, at 1166. According to one commentator, the
Bykofsky court, although noting that the Supreme Court had not articulated a framework for
analyzing differences between rights of adults and children, offered no framework itself to justify
applying a rational basis test. See id. The same commentator has also noted that the Bykofsky court's
rationale appears backwards. "jT]he court should first determine the appropriate level of scrutiny by

ascertaining whether a fundamental right is at stake, and only then should it consider the state's
interests to assess whether they outweigh the right in the specific instance." Id. at n.17; see also
Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D.D.C. 1989) ("This Court, however, cannot agree with
BykofsLy that the constitutional rights of minors are less deserving of constitutional protection than
those of adults under these circumstances. The Court thus disagrees with the result of the Bykofsky
court's due process balancing test.").
69. See In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385, 1388-89 (Haw. 1973).
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the Washington Supreme Court declared an ordinance, prohibiting

persons under the age of eighteen from loitering in public areas,
unconstitutionally vague and held the ordinance to be an invalid exercise

of legitimate police power.70 The court held that "'[i]t is fundamental

that no ordinance may unreasonably or unnecessarily interfere with a
person's freedom,"''.' and that the "ordinance, as drafted, [went] beyond

the scope of legitimate police power authority."72

In 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that a
curfew which lacked a termination time was excessively vague and
therefore violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

States Constitution.73

In 1981, the Fifth Circuit also reviewed the constitutionality of a
juvenile curfew ordinance.74 The court stated that even though a minor's
rights are "not coextensive with those of adults, ' ' S minors do have
certain fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech,76 religion,7 7
association, 7 and travel. 79 The court found that the curfew ordinance
burdened these rights.80 While recognizing the constitutional factors
listed in Bellotti,81 the court concluded that they did not apply, and that
the ordinance did not justify restraining the actions of juveniles in a way
that would be unconstitutional if applied to adults.82 As a result, the
70. See City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059, 1060-61 (Wash. 1973) (en banc).
71. Id. at 1063 (quoting City of Seattle v. Drew, 423 P.2d 522, 524 (Wash. 1967) (en banc)).
72. Id. at 1064 (citing Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266, 272 (S.D. Fla. 1969)).
73. See Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976); see also W. J. W. v.
State, 356 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that ajuvenile curfew that "[r]estrain[ed]
children ...from freely walking upon the streets or other public places when no emergency
exist[ed] ...[was] incompatible with the freedoms of speech, association, peaceful assembly and
religion," and was therefore unconstitutional); In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368, 372 (Ohio Ct. C.P.
1978) (holding that, in the absence of a compelling state interest, an ordinance that deprived minors
of their fundamental rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments was unconstitutional).
74. See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
75. Id. at 1072.
76. See id.
77. See id. (citing Vest Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
78. See id. (citing Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1980)).
79. See id. (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)).
80. See id.
81. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979); see also supra notes 44-49 and
accompanying text.
82. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1073 ('We need not conduct such an inquiry in
tBellotml ...since none of the three factors... apply to the overly broad restrictions with which
we are concerned."). The court held that no issue of'"peculiar vulnerability" of children existed with
respect to children attending or traveling to or from school, religious activities, employment, or even
being on the sidewalk in front of their house. See id. Secondly, the court held that the activities
prohibited by the ordinance did not involve any "critical decisions" on the part of minors. See id.
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court held that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad. 3
In 1983, the Florida District Court of Appeals invalidated a curfew
ordinance after finding that the "relationship between the practice of
barring children ... from public places.. . and the objective of

safeguarding minors is not compelling enough to justify the serious
invasion of personal rights and liberties."' A year later, a federal district court in New Hampshire reviewed a juvenile curfew and found that
it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
was therefore unconstitutional. 5 The court held that the curfew impinged upon juveniles' liberty interest in free movement to pursue
legitimate activities 6 and the parents' protected liberty interest in child

rearing." Additionally, the court stated that even though juvenile rights
are not as extensive as those of adults, and can be restricted in a manner

that would be unconstitutional if applied to adults, the ordinance in
question was so broad as to "not meet even these diluted standards for
regulation of juvenile activities."88
In 1989, the Iowa Supreme Court in City of Panora v. Simmons
found that a juvenile curfew was constitutional. 9 In 1992, the court

reviewed another juvenile curfew in City of Maquoketa v. Russell and
found that the curfew was unconstitutional." In the latter case, the court
held that the ordinance implicated the fundamental rights of minors,91

Lastly, the court held that the curfew inhibited, rather than promoted, the parental role of child
rearing, because the curfew removed from the parent the decision of when and where a child might
permissibly be away from home. See id. at 1073-74.
83. See id. at 1074.
84. S.W. v. State, 431 So. 2d 339, 341 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In 1991, Florida's First
District Court of Appeal revisited the juvenile curfew question and again ruled that the curfew was
unconstitutional. See K.LJ. v. State, 581 So. 2d 920, 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding the
curfew overbroad since it could "be applied in a manner which would infringe on the basis [sic]
rights guaranteed by the United States and Florida Constitutions").
85. See McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1984).
86. See id. at 1385.
87. See id. at 1386 (ordinance restricts parents' liberty interest in child rearing by "usurping
parental discretion in supervising a child's activities and imposing parental liability').
88. Id. at 1385; see also Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478,486-87 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987) (holding that the state's juvenile curfew ordinance violated the fundamental rights
of children without a compelling state interest at stake and "interfere[d] with the right of parents to
have their children exercise those rights"); City of Wadsworth v. Owens, 536 N.E.2d 67, 68-69
(Ohio Mun. Ct. 1987) (finding that minors have certain constitutional rights that are also guaranteed
to adults, and holding that the state's curfew violated minors' First Amendment freedom of religion
and Ninth Amendment right to move about freely).
89. 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989).
90. 484 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Iowa 1992).
91. See id. at 184 (rights included religion, speech, assembly, and association).
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even though such rights were not "automatically coextensive" with the
rights of adults.' The court distinguished its earlier ruling in Simmons
by noting that in Russell, it was not deciding whether the "ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad or whether the right to travel was in some
instances protected by the First Amendment."'93
In Waters v. Barry,94 the district court for Washington, D.C.
reviewed a juvenile curfew using an approach that best illustrates the
contemporary approach used by courts in assessing the constitutionality
of juvenile curfew ordinances. 95 The Washington, D.C. City Council
had enacted a juvenile curfew in an effort "to reduce the incidence of
juvenile violence, both against and by juveniles, to reduce juveniles'
exposure to drug trafficking and other criminal activity, and to aid parents and others responsible for juveniles in carrying out their supervisory
obligations." 96 The court held that the curfew was "constitutionally
unacceptable" since it could not be enforced "without violating the
constitutional rights of thousands of innocent minors."97 The court
found that the curfew infringed upon First Amendment rights of
expression and association, as well as Fifth Amendment substantive due
process rights. 98
Rights are not absolute. Fundamental rights can be infringed upon
if the government narrowly tailors the ordinance to cover the perceived
harm and does not "needless[ly] intru[de] upon the constitutional interests
of the innocent." 99 In applying this principle, the Waters court thoroughly discussed the importance of the exceptions to the ordinance.'

92. See id.at 184-86. The court found that "the ordinance here is not drawn narrowly to
provide exceptions for emancipated minors and fundamental rights under the First Amendment." Id.
at 186.
93. See id.
at 182; see also Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599, 606-09 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992) (finding the curfew unconstitutionally vague and therefore not examining other grounds for
the invalidity of the ordinance), vacated on other grounds, 660 A.2d 447 (Md. 1995).
94. 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989).
95. See Jordan, supra note 28, at 399.
96. Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1127.

97. Id. at 1128.
98. See id.
at 1134. The court held that "Itihe right to walk the streets, or to meet publicly with
one's friends for a noble purpose or for no purpose at all--and to do so whenever one pleases-is
an integral component of life in a free and ordered society." Id.
99. Id. at 1135.
100. See id.
at 1141-43. The ordinance provided in pertinent part:
(d) This section shall not apply:
(1) When a minor is accompanied by a parent;
(2) When a minor is returning home by way of a direct route from an activity that is
sponsored by an educational, religious, or non-profit organization within 60 minutes of
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Although these exceptions were found to be constitutionally significant,
the act still "'broadly stifle[d]' the fundamental liberty interests of

thousands of perfectly innocent, law-abiding juveniles who live in or who
may visit the District of Columbia.''
The court also held that the constitutional rights of minors are as
deserving of constitutional protection as are the rights of adults. 10 2 In
reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed the three Bellotti fac-

tors--the peculiar vulnerability of children; children's inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of
the parental role in child rearing' 03 -and found that the factors, as
applied to the curfew involved, made it "clear that there is no basis for
treating juveniles differently than adults.' 4
In applying the first Bellotti factor, the peculiar vulnerability of
children, the court found that "the plague afflicting the District poses no
peculiar danger to children; those thousands of the District's juveniles
who engage in wholly legitimate nocturnal activities are no05 more

endangered in the current climate than are the District's adults."'

In addressing the second Bellotti factor, a juvenile's inability to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, the Waters court
concluded that "the decision to either stay inside or roam at night simply
does not present the type of profound decision which Bellotti would

the termination of the activity, if the activity has been registered with the Mayor in
advance;
(3) When a minor is traveling in a motor vehicle;
(4) When a minor is acting within the scope of legitimate employment pursuant to An
Act To regulate the employment of minors within the District of Columbia, approved
May 29, 1928 (45 Stat. 998; D.C. Code, sec. 36-501 et seq.), and the minor has in his
or her possession a copy of a valid work or theatrical permit or an affidavit from the
employer, or
(5) When, due to reasonable necessity:
(A) A minor who is a custodial parent is engaged in an emergency errand that is directly
related to the health or safety of his or her child and the minor describes the nature of
the health or safety emergency; or
(B) A minor is engaged in an emergency errand and the minor has in his or her
possession, if practicable, a written statement signed by the parent, which states the
errand is directly related to the health or safety of the parent or family member and that
describes the nature of the errand and the health or safety emergency.
Id. at 1141-42.
101. Id. at 1136.
102. See id. (disagreeing with the court's holding in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401
F. Supp. 1242, 1256 (M.D. Pa. 1975)).
103. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
104. Waters, 711 F. Supp at 1137.
105. Id.
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leave to the state."'' 6 The court reasoned that the decision to stay out
late did not pose the "serious consequences" that the Bellotti court envi10 7
sioned.
The third Bellotti factor, the importance of the parental role in child
rearing, was found to be inapplicable in this context because the curfew
"frustrat[ed] the parental role in the vast majority of the District's
families," rather than furthering it.'0 8 According to the court, the
"curfew rests upon the... assumption that the traditional family unit, in
which parents exercise control over their childrens' activities, has dissolved."10 9 However, the court disagreed with this assumption, stating
that it ignored the many families in which parents still maintain control
over their children."0 For those families, the curfew "gracelessly
arrogates unto itself and to the police the precious rights of parenthood." ''
The court held that the curfew violated the Fifth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause by impermissibly distinguishing between juveniles and non-juveniles."' The court applied a strict scrutiny analysis
since the curfew burdened First Amendment rights and Fifth Amendment
liberty interests. In applying a strict scrutiny analysis, the court stated
that the law would only be sustained if it was "narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest."' 3 The court conceded that a compelling
state interest was involved, but concluded that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."'
The ordinance assumed that juveniles who went out at night to
engage in illegal activities would be deterred from doing so by the
imposition of the curfew. However, engaging in illegal activities carries
a stricter punishment than violating a curfew ordinance similar to the one
in Waters."' Therefore, if the juveniles are not already deterred by the
heavier sanctions of the underlying crime, the curfew sanction will have
little, if any, additional impact. Indeed, the curfew will likely only impact
106. Id.

107. See id.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.at 1138.
Id.

114. See id.
at 1139 ("'[]n practical effect, the challenged classification simply does not operate
so as rationally to further' the Act's express objectives." (quoting United States v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 537 (1973))).
115. See id.
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those "already inclined to obey the law."".6
Additionally, curfews do not seem to solve the problem. The Waters
court cited statistics to support its finding that the ordinance was not "so
closely related to the protection of minors ... as to justify the infringement of constitutional interests."' 7 In fact, the court found that not one
juvenile was killed at a time when the curfew would have been in
effect."' Furthermore, half of the juveniles killed were killed at their
homes." 9
IV. QUTB V. STRAUSS
In an effort to combat juvenile violence and gang activity, the City
Council of Dallas, Texas enacted a comprehensive juvenile curfew on
June 12, 1991.120 The ordinance prohibits a person under the age of
seventeen from remaining in a public place or establishment from 11:00
p.m. until 6:00 a.m. on weeknights, and from 12 midnight until 6:00 a.m.
on weekends.' 2 ' The curfew's broad-scaled restrictions are dotted with
numerous exceptions." For example, the curfew is not violated if the
juvenile is accompanied by or on an errand for a parent or guardian.'23
Furthermore, juveniles engaged in interstate travel, attending a school or
religious function, or even exercising their First Amendment rights, also
fall outside the ambit of the curfew. 2 4
Two weeks after the Dallas curfew first went into effect, Elizabeth
Qutb and three other parents filed suit in federal district court challenging

116. When dealing with fundamental rights, this inversion of anticipated effect renders the
ordinance unconstitutional. See id.
117. Id. The court specifically found the following:
In 1988, of the 26 juveniles killed in the District (out of 372 total killed, or 7%), not one
was clearly killed at a time or place that he or she would not have been had the curfew
been in effect. Precisely half of these killings occurred in the juvenile's home. As the
plaintiffs point out, this would suggest that it is as dangerous in one's home as it is in
the street. Moreover, according to the District's own figures, approximately half of the
homicides in the District between 1985 and 1988 occurred during non-curfew hours. The
daytime would therefore appear to be just as hazardous as the night, at least in terms of
homicides.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 490 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134
(1994).
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. For the full text of the Dallas curfew ordinance, see Appendix.
124. See id.
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the constitutionality of the curfew."z "The district court certified the

plaintiffs as a class that consisted of two sub-classes: persons under the
age of 6 seventeen, and parents of persons under the age of seven12
teen."2
The district court found that the curfew violated the United States
Constitution and the Texas constitution.127 Specifically, the court held
that the ordinance restricted the First Amendment right of free association of juveniles, and the juveniles' equal protection rights were also
violated.'2 8 The city appealed and129the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding
that the curfew was constitutional.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, the government may not treat

similarly situated persons differently. 3 If the legislation does not
disadvantage a "suspect class" or infringe upon a fundamental right, the

legislation will survive an equal protection challenge if it is rationally
related to a compelling governmental interest. 3' A strict scrutiny
analysis will be applied to legislation if it disadvantages a "suspect class"

or infringes upon a fundamental right.3 2 In Qutb, the Fifth Circuit performed a strict scrutiny analysis of the juvenile curfew ordinance.' 33

Because a classification based upon age is not a recognized suspect
125. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 491. On July 3, 1991, Qutb and others filed suit seeking a temporary
restraining order. See id. On July 9, 1991, the court decided to hear the case on the merits and
consolidated with the hearing on the application for temporary and permanent injunctions. See id.
The case was tried on July 22-23, 1991. See id. The city voluntarily delayed enforcement of the
curfew pending the court's decision. See id. On June 10, 1992, the city substantially amended the
ordinance, and on June 25, 1992, the complaint was amended to include the amended ordinance. See
id. Further evidence was presented by both sides on July 20, 1992. See id. For cases addressing
curfews after the decision in Qutb v. Strauss, see Inre JuvenileAction No. JT9065297, 887 P.2d 599
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (relying heavily on Qutb, the court held the juvenile curfew constitutional);
Metropolitan Dade County v. Pred, 665 So. 2d 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding a curfew
constitutional); and Hutchins v. DistrictofColumbia, 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996) (applying the
Bellotti factors to a curfew ordinance modeled after the Dallas ordinance and finding it unconstitutional).
126. Qutb, 11 F.3dat491.
127. See Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1992),
rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Qutb v. Bartlett,
114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994). This Comment only discusses the violation of the United States Constitution
and not the questions arising with regard to the rights protected under the Texas Constitution.
128. See id. at 30-38.
129. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 488.
130. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); see also Sam R.
Hananel, Qutb v. Strauss: The Fifth Circuit Upholds a Narrowly Tailored Juvenile Curfew
Ordinance, 69 TVL. L. REv¢. 308, 309 (1994).
131. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216-17 (1982)).
132. See id.
133. See id.
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classification, the court of appeals "assume[d] without deciding that the
right to move about freely [was] a fundamental right.', 3 4 Since the
ordinance35 involved a fundamental right, the court reviewed it with strict
scrutiny.

To survive a strict scrutiny analysis, a classification created by the
ordinance "must promote a compelling governmental interest, and it must
be narrowly tailored to achieve this interest."' 3 6 In this case, the city
of Dallas enacted the ordinance to reduce juvenile crime and victimization, while promoting juvenile safety. The court recognized this interest
as compelling 137 and found it unnecessary to apply the Bellotti factors,
since the plaintiffs and the district court both conceded that the state's
138
interest was compelling.
The court next determined that the curfew ordinance was narrowly
tailored to achieve the requisite compelling interest. 139 "To be narrowly
tailored, there must be a nexus between the stated government interest
and the classification created by the ordinance."'40 This nexus test "'ensures that the means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was

illegitimate.""14' Although precise data could not be supplied, the court
found that the city had presented sufficient data for it to conclude that
the classification
created by the ordinance "fit" the state's compelling
42
interest.

134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. See id. "The Supreme Court has recognized that the state 'has a strong and legitimate
interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack ofjudgment
may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely."' Id. (quoting Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990)).
138. See id. at 492 n.6.
139. See id. at 493.
140. Id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)).
141. Id. (quoting J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493).
142. See id. The court based its determination on the following statistics presented by the city
of Dallas to the district court:
1. Juvenile crime increases proportionally with age between ten years old and sixteen
years old.
2. In 1989, Dallas recorded 5,160 juvenile arrests, while in 1990 there were 5,425
juvenile arrests. In 1990 there were forty murders, ninety-one sex offenses, 233 robberies,
and 230 aggravated assaults committed by juveniles. From January 1991 through April
1991, juveniles were arrested for twenty-one murders, thirty sex offenses, 128 robberies,
107 aggravated assaults, and 1,042 crimes against property.
3. Murders are most likely to occur between 10:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. and most likely
to occur in apartments and apartment parking lots and streets and highways.
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The court also decided that the curfew employed the least restrictive
means of accomplishing its goals because of the ordinance's numerous
defenses." The court found that the numerous defenses narrowed the
scope of the ordinance and therefore allowed the city to meet its stated
goals, while still respecting minors' rights."4 The court conceded that
the ordinance would restrict some late-night juvenile activities, but when
these restrictions were balanced with the compelling interest sought to be
protected, the impositions were found to be minor. 4 5 Furthermore, the
court dismissed the parental plaintiffs' argument "that the curfew ordinance violates their fundamental right of privacy because it dictates the
manner in which their children must be raised."' 146 Although the court
"recognize[d] ...a parent's right to rear their children without undue
governmental
interference," the court concluded this intrusion was mini47
mal)
V. PITFALLS OF THE QUTB RATIONALE
Since the curfew in Qutb infringed upon a fundamental right, the
ordinance was subjected to strict scrutiny. The district court and the court
of appeals differed, however, as to whether the ordinance was tailored
narrowly enough to achieve its stated goal and thus survive a strict
scrutiny analysis. This Comment contends that, for numerous reasons, the

4. Aggravated assaults are most likely to occur between 11:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m.
5. Rapes are most likely to occur between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. and sixteen percent
of rapes occur on public streets and highways.
6. Thirty-one percent of robberies occur on streets and highways.
Id.; see also id. at 493 n.7 (stating that the court will "not... insist upon detailed studies of the
precise severity, nature, and characteristics of the juvenile crime problem in analyzing whether the
ordinance meets constitutional muster when it is conceded that the juvenile crime problem in Dallas
constitutes a compelling state interest').
143. See id. at 493.
144. See id. at 494 (citing Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. Unit
A 1981)) (distinguishing its earlier ruling in Johnson by specifically reserving an opinion on the
"validity of curfew ordinances narrowly drawn to accomplish proper social objectives"). The court
stated that the "'curfew ordinance, however valid might be a narrowly drawn curfew to protect
society's valid interests, [swept] within its ambit a number of innocent activities which are
constitutionally protected."' Id. (quoting Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072, 1074 (alteration in original)).
145. See id. at 495 ("Thus, after carefully examining the juvenile curfew ordinance enacted by
the city of Dallas, we conclude that it is narrowly tailored to address the city's compelling interest
and any burden this ordinance places upon minors' constitutional rights will be minimal.").
146. Id.
147. Id. The right of parents to rear their children without governmental interference has been
recognized as a fundamental component of due process in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968).
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court of appeals failed to adequately review the facts presented to find
the required nexus.
A.

Dismissal of a Full Bellotti Analysis

The existence of a compelling state interest does not necessarily
justify the disparate treatment the court of appeals afforded the juveniles
in this case, and therefore, the court should have undertaken a full
Bellotti analysis to determine whether the disparate treatment was
warranted.'4 8 In concluding that the Equal Protection Clause was not
violated, the court of appeals used the parties' concession that a compel49
ling state interest existed to avoid conducting a Bellotti analysis.1
A state can restrict a minor in ways that would be unconstitutional
if applied to an adult, provided that the restriction furthers a "'significant
state interest ... that is not present in the case of an adult.""11 50 The
Bellotti Court formulated three factors to guide courts in determining
what restrictions a state can place on minors that it cannot impose on
adults. 5 ' According to the Bellotti Court, if these factors are present,
juveniles may be treated differently than adults. 152 The mere fact that
a compelling state interest exists should not carry as much weight as it
did in the Qutb court's analysis.' 53 Courts can use a concession by all
parties as to the existence of a compelling state interest to assist in
balancing the factors, but it does not give courts the authority to bypass
the balancing of the factors. A Bellotti analysis still should be performed
to determine if a significant state interest not present in the case of adults
is applicable to children. A significant state interest exists in protecting
all citizens from crime, but general curfews affecting adults have been
held to be unconstitutional."5 The Bellotti analysis allows a court to
determine if the particular characteristics of a child elevates this interest
to the point where the state can restrict a juvenile's activity, even though
they cannot restrict adults in the same manner. A proper analysis of the
Bellotti factors shows that the particular characteristics of children do not
148. See Hananel, supra note 130, at 316.
149. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 n.6.
150. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (quoting Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976)).
151. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
152. See id.

153. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492 n.6.
154. See Ruffv. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303, 305 (M.D. Ga. 1977); City of Portland v. James,
444 P.2d 554, 556-57 (Or. 1968) (in banc). But see Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1916)
(upholding general vagrancy and curfew statutes).
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make the interest of the city of Dallas such that they can restrict the
rights of children differently than adults in this context.
The first Bellotti factor, the peculiar vulnerability of children, does
not justify reducing the level of a minor's constitutional protection.
Simply because there is crime on the streets at night does not make
minors any more susceptible to that crime than adults walking the same
streets at night.'55 Furthermore, the evidence presented by the city of
Dallas regarding street crime did not establish that minors were
peculiarly vulnerable.156
The second Bellotti factor, children's inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner, does not apply because a
curfew that keeps children off the streets is not an attempt to shield
children from any specific emotional traumas to which they are
particularly susceptible, but rather is "an attempt to shelter them from
some unspecified future harm-an attempt that simultaneously forecloses
many beneficial opportunities." ' 7 Additionally, most activities restricted by a curfew do not present the type of the difficult choices that
Bellotti would relegate to the states.1 58 For example, deciding whether
to go for ice cream after a movie, or to stay late at a friend's house,
arguably does not present juveniles with the same type of profound
decision as does the choice to have an abortion, 159 or to purchase
pornographic material.1 6
Lastly, the third Bellotti factor, the importance of a parental role in
child rearing, is not furthered by the enactment of a juvenile curfew. A
juvenile curfew does not promote the parental role, but rather inhibits
it.161 The ordinance does not give parents the power to make decisions
concerning the amount of freedom and responsibility they should give
their children, but instead exchanges this parental judgment with the presumed superior judgment of the state. 62

155. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D.D.C. 1989).

156. See Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 25 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1992),
rev'd sub nom.Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994);
see also infra notes 163-81 and accompanying text.
157. Assessing Minors' Rights, supra note 41, at 1176.
158. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137; see also Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065,

1073 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981).
159. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979).

160. See id. at 636 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), which dealt with the
sale of sexually oriented magazines).

161. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1073-74; see also Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137.
162. See Qutb, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, at 27.
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B. Ignoring the Statistics Against Curfews
The Fifth Circuit in Qutb applied a strict scrutiny analysis to the
curfew ordinance." Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the classifications
created by the ordinance are accorded "no presumption of constitutionality." 164 In this case, the classification is based upon age, separating
those under seventeen from those seventeen and older. 65 A strict
scrutiny analysis requires the classification to promote a compelling state
interest and the ordinance to represent the least "restrictive means
available to effectuate the desired end."'6 In Qutb, the desired end was
to increase juvenile safety and to decrease juvenile crime. The district
court found that "the City totally failed to establish that the Ordinance's
classification between minors and nonminors is narrowly tailored to
achieve the stated goals of the curfew."167 Additionally, the city of
Dallas failed to establish that "the curfew would cause a reduction in
juvenile crimes or victims. ' 168 The city presented the following evidence:
1. Juvenile crime increases proportionally with age between ten years
old and sixteen years old.
2. In 1989, Dallas recorded 5,160 juvenile arrests, while in 1990
there were 5,425 juvenile arrests. In 1990 there were forty murders,
ninety-one sex offenses, 233 robberies, and 230 aggravated assaults
committed by juveniles. From January 1991 through April 1991, juveniles were arrested for twenty-one murders, thirty sex offenses, 128
robberies, 107 aggravated assaults, and 1,042 crimes against property.
3. Murders are most likely to occur between 10:00 p.m. and 1:00
a.m. and most likely to occur in apartments and apartment parking lots
and streets and highways.
4. Aggravated assaults are most likely to occur between 11:00 p.m.
and 1:00 a.m.
5. Rapes are most likely to occur between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m.
and sixteen percent of rapes occur on public streets and highways.

163. See Qutb v. Strauss, It F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134

(1994).
164. Tovm of Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049, 1059 (5th Cir. 1984).

165. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492.
166.

Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1195 (5th Cir. 1977).

167. Qutb, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, at 35 (finding that the city did not have statistics showing the
number of juveniles who commit or are the victims of crimes during curfew hours).
168. Id.
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Thirty-one percent of robberies occur on streets and highways. 169_

[7.] [J]uveniles commit a significant percentage of the crimes in
Dallas: 5-6%.
[8.] ...[F]or the five-month period between January and May, [1992]
the City has a record of only 256 arrests that occurred during curfew
hours and in public places. Of these, 8% (26 offenses) involved harm
to another individual, either by aggravated assault or aggravated
robbery.
[9.] ...[O]ver 54% of the gang members are 17 or over and would
not be subject to the curfew 7 °
The district court held that the evidence produced by the city of
Dallas did not establish that juveniles committed crimes or that they were
victims of crimes during the curfew hours.' According to the court,
the statistics merely demonstrated that crimes occurred during the curfew
hours; the city assumed that the juveniles committed some of the crimes;
and that some juveniles were victims during these curfew hours. 7 2 The
court concluded that the city's assumption did not prove that the curfew
was narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest and,
therefore, did not support the claim that the curfew infringed upon a
juvenile's fundamental rights. 73
In contrast to the district court, the Fifth Circuit held:
Although the city was unable to provide precise data concerning the
number of juveniles who commit crimes during the curfew hours, or
the number of juvenile victims of crimes committed during the curfew,
the city nonetheless provided sufficient data to demonstrate that the
classification created by the ordinance "fits" the state's compelling
74
interest.1
In view of the compelling state interest, the court would not "insist upon

169. Quib, 11 F.3d at 493.
170. Qutb, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, at 35-37 (footnote omitted).
171. See id. at 36-37.
172. See id. The court also stated that "[o]pponents of the Ordinance may well question the
wisdom of a law that subjects every juvenile in Dallas to a curfew because of about 51 juvenile
arrests per month." Id. at 36 n.79.
173. See id. at 36-37.
174. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493.
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detailed studies of the precise severity, nature, and characteristics of the
'
juvenile crime problem."175
The depth of the district court's analysis was more in line with a
strict scrutiny analysis because, as one commentator has noted, the
request that proof be offered to show that "the ordinance would affect the
juvenile crime problem is hardly a demand for 'scientifically certain'
data., 176 As the district court recognized, the data offered did not show
how many juveniles committed, participated in, or were victims of crime
during the curfew hours, and therefore, no hard support for the curfew
was offered. Without support, the required nexus between the compelling
state interest and the classification created by the ordinance cannot be
established.
A review of the available statistics reveals that the support necessary
to prove that a juvenile curfew will be an effective crime preventer and
victim protector is lacking. As the Waters court observed, the statistics
from the District of Columbia revealed that in 1988, of the twenty-six
juveniles killed, not one was killed in a place or at a time when the
curfew would have been in effect.177 Additionally, half of these killings
occurred in the home, thereby making it78just as dangerous for the
juveniles to stay home as it was to go out.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, "violent crimes
committed by juveniles peak at the close of the school day and decline
throughout the evening hours.' 79 Interestingly, juveniles are the
victims of violent crimes usually during the same time period when
juveniles are committing violent crimes.18° Furthermore, according to
the National Counsel on Crime and Delinquency in San Francisco, fourfifths of all violent crimes occur during the daylight hours."l ' If the

175. Id. at 493 n.7. The court further stated that "we 'do not demand of legislatures
scientifically certain criteria of legislation."' Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642

(1968)).
176. Hananel, supra note 130, at 317.
177. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1139 (D.D.C. 1989).

178. See id.
179.

HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A

NATIONAL REPORT 48 (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention ed., 1995) (the peak
hour of violent juvenile crime is 3 p.m.).
180. See id.; see also HJ. Cummins, Fear of Crime, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 29, 1995, at B1
(leading criminologist James Fox providing statistics demonstrating that the highest time of risk for
teen crime and teen pregnancy is 3 p.m. to 6 p.m.).

181. See After Dark, supra note 27, at 26; see also 20/20: Time to Go Home, at 12 (ABC
television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1994) (transcript on file with the HofstraLaw Review) [hereinafter Time
to Go Home] ("[M]ore kids are killed or injured by their parents, so if you really want to protect
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government is truly concerned about protecting juveniles and preventing
juveniles from committing violent crimes, judging from the statistics, a

curfew would be most effective if imposed immediately after school. If
the court of appeals had examined the statistics presented, it would have
been clear that the curfew restricted the freedom of thousands of innocent
juveniles based upon statistics which, upon closer examination, demonstrated that the required nexus was not present.
C. Dismissal of a General Right of Association
The district court in Qutb held that a minor's First Amendment right
of association was impermissibly impinged upon by the enacted
curfew."8 2 The district court found that the right to free association is a
fundamental right." 3 The Supreme Court has recognized the funda-

mental right of association in two contexts: intimate relationships,"
and the exercise of First Amendment rights of "speech, assembly,
petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion.""'
The Supreme Court has also recognized the right to associate for social
87
purposes 86 and the right to move about freely in public places.
The rights of social association and locomotion have been recognized'8 8

kids, you should pass a law, saying kids can't be home between 7:00 and midnight ...when most
of the abuse is said to occur.').
182. See Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 30-34 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10,
1992), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134
(1994).
183. See id. at 21 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1989); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion)).
184. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
185. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
186. See generally Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974) (right to associate
for social clubs or organizations) (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting)); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (recognizing the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to gather in public places for social or political purposes);
Griswold,381 U.S. at 483 (free association not limited only to political assemblies, but also to those
that "pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit" (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
430-31 (1963))).
187. See generally Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-66 (1972)
(discussing the right to walk, wander, or stroll without any reason as falling in the "sensitive First
Amendment area"); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (discussing freedom
of movement as "kin to the right of assembly and to the right of association").
188. See Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)
(recognizing the First Amendment right to association for social purposes and the right of "all
citizens" to travel freely within and between the states without unreasonable governmental burden).
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and upheld 8 9 by the Fifth Circuit and other federal courts.' 9° These
authorities led the district court in Qutb to conclude that the right to
associate for social purposes and to freely use public streets and public
places are fundamental liberties under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 191
The Fifth Circuit dismissed this freedom of association claim in a
footnote, observing that the Supreme Court has held there to be no
"generalized right of social association."192 The Supreme Court in City
of Dallas v. Stanglin held that chance meetings in dance halls and other
purely recreational functions are not protected by the First Amend-

ment. 93 The district court acknowledged this Supreme Court ruling but
distinguished it by reasoning that "a juvenile curfew ordinance operates
in a much more 'blunderfuss' fashion and proscribes a wide range of
protected First Amendment activities that were not addressed in
Stanglin."'19 4 The curfew effectively prohibits not only "chance

encounters" in dance halls and other random associations, but also forms
of expression clearly encompassed and protected by the First Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit overcame this problem by relying on the numerous
exceptions that the ordinance allows. The court held that as a result of
the exceptions, the ordinance was tailored narrowly enough to address the
city's compelling state interest and that any burden the ordinance placed

189. See Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1041 (5th Cir. 1980)
(upholding the fundamental right to "go where one pleases"), rev'd in part, 455 U.S. 283 (1982);
Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1980) (granting constitutional protection to
associate on street corners).
190. See generally Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 143-44 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that
the right of "citizens to walk the streets, without explanation or formal papers, is surely among the
cherished liberties that distinguish this nation from so many others"); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp.
1125, 1134 (D.D.C. 1989) (characterizing the right to walk the streets whenever one pleases as an
"integral component of life in a free and ordered society"); Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974,
976 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (stating that '[t]he rights of locomotion, freedom of movement, to go where
one pleases, and to use the public streets in a way that does not interfere with the personal liberty
of others' are implicit in the first and fourteenth amendments" (quoting Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 1976))).
191. See Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 22-23 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10,
1992), rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134
(1994).
192. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488,495 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114S. Ct. 2134 (1994)
(quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)).
193. 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).

194. Qutb, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, at 23 n.45 (agreeing with the court in Waters v. Barry,711
F. Supp. 1125, 1135 n.16 (D.D.C 1989)).
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upon a minor's rights would be minimal. 9 5 According to the court,
through the exceptions, the state was able to draw the curfew so that the
least restrictive means were used to accomplished its goals. 96 The
problem with this rationale, however, is that the numerous exceptions
have problems of their own and will result in more than a minimal intrusion into the fundamental rights of juveniles.
If a minor is attending a recreational activity supervised by adults
and sponsored by the city of Dallas, a civic organization, or another
similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or if the minor is
returning home from this activity, the minor will have a defense to the
imposition of the curfew.' 97 According to the district court, due to the
vagueness of the term "'recreational activities"' and "'other similar
entity,"' "this exception is unworkable from the standpoint of the minor
facing arrest, the enforcing officer, and the fact finder that must
determine guilt or innocence.' 98
The term "recreation" can be interpreted in numerous ways
depending on the person making the interpretation.' 99 For some,
reading a book is recreational, while for others it is boring. Likewise,
walking the streets may be recreational for some, while for others it is
just "being up to no good." Therefore, what constitutes a "recreational
activity" is a subjective determination. A minor planning to attend an
event must guess as to whether a police officer who might stop him
would consider his activity recreational. Furthermore, those responsible
for enforcing the curfew maintain vast amounts of discretion in determining whether the activity is recreational; therefore, they also have a lot
of discretion to determine whether or not to arrest for a curfew violation.
Lastly, those who must determine guilt or innocence after the arrest have
vast discretion as well.
The term "other similar entity" is just as vague and ambiguous as
"recreation." The only guideline provided for this term is that some
degree of adult supervision and responsibility over the minor is involved,

195. See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495 n.9.

196. See id. at 493-94.
197. See id. at 498 (noting § (c)(1)(G) of the Dallas curfew ordinance).
198.

Qutb, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, at 33.

199. See id.;see also AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1511 (3d
ed. 1992) (defining recreation as the "[r]efreshment of one's mind or body after work through
activity that amuses or stimulates; play").
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which could result in this term being interpreted differently each time it
is applied. 00
Another defense to the curfew involves a minor who is "exercising
First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution, such
as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of
assembly."' It was clear to the district court that "the City ha[d] no
intention of permitting minors to exercise their due process and
associational rights to move about the City during curfew hours without
an officially sanctioned purpose."2' 2 Moreover, if the police and others
responsible for enforcing the curfew were to honor the First Amendment
exception, the ordinance would be self-defeating because a "gaping hole"
would exist in the ordinance.20 3 If the First Amendment exception is
respected and enforced appropriately, the exception encompasses many
of the activities the curfew is meant to prohibit. Since this exception may
well have put the curfew out of existence, and the proof offered shows
that the rights were not going to be respected, one cannot say that the
exception provides the kind of protection to minors that the Fifth Circuit
relied so heavily upon in finding the curfew constitutional.
V. IN THE WAKE OF QUTB AND GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH CURFEWS

A.

Floodgates of Curfews

Cities across the country awaited the Fifth Circuit's decision before
determining whether they should enact their own curfews. After the Fifth
Circuit found the Dallas curfew constitutional and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari, "[o]rdinances banning youths from city
streets [began] popping up like mushrooms after a spring rain."2 4 Dallas officials received forty calls from cities across the country requesting
a copy of the curfew that passed constitutional review.205 In June 1994,

200. See Quib, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, at 33-34.
201. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 498 (quoting § (c)(1)(H) of the Dallas curfew ordinance).
202. Qutb, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, at 34.
203. See Hananel, supra note 130, at 317.
204. With Dallas Curfew OK'd. Others Rush to Follow Suit, LAW ENFORCEMENT NEWS, June
30, 1994, at 6 [hereinafter DallasCurfew]. For a summary of statutory provisions relating to curfews
in U.S. cities with a population of more than 100,000, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl. 1.97
(1995).
205. See Annmarie Sarsfield, Cities Impose Teen Curfews. NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 10, 1994,
at 21; see also Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 678 (D.D.C. 1996) ('Rather than
draft curfew legislation herself, [staff member to Councilmember Harold Brazil] requested a copy
of, and relied upon, the Dallas, Texas curfew" that "the District [of Columbia] adopted wholesale.).
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the following curfew-related activities took place:
Denver officials began enforcing a curfew for youths under 18 ....
Orlando, Fla., officials said ... they [would] enforce a curfew in a

downtown club district.
Enforcement of a curfew that was approved by the Dallas suburb of
Cedar Hill ....

Officials in Fort Worth, Texas, said they [would] adopt a curfew law
patterned after the one in Dallas.
New Orleans police reported that 46 teenagers were detained on the
night of June 1, [1994] when its dusk-to-dawn curfew went into effect.

Ten police officers in Columbus, Ohio, were assigned June 10 to
enforce a midnight curfew in effect on weekends in some areas of the

city. Enforcement sites [were to] be based on the number of complaints
from residents and information supplied by patrol officers.
City lawyers in Springfield, Mass., ... [were] drawing up a

curfew plan that [would] prohibit youths under 18 from being on the
streets from 11 P.M. to 6 A.M. Sunday through Thursday and after
midnight on Friday and Saturday.

The Washington, D.C., District Council failed to approve a
proposed curfew law following a hearing on the issue .... The curfew
would banish youths under 17 from the streets, beginning at 11 P.M.
Sunday through Thursday and at midnight on Fridays and Satur206
days.

With the rush to enact juvenile curfews, the effectiveness of these
curfews is being questioned,20 7 making one wonder whether the

206. Dallas Curfew, supra note 204, at 6. Other cities that have enacted curfews after the
decision in Qutb v. Strauss include Pasadena, Rosenberg, Richmond, Humble, South Houston, and
Missouri City. See Houston Suburbs Find Teen Curfews Help Reduce Crime, DALLAS MORNING
NEws, Aug. 22, 1994, at I IA [hereinafter Houston Suburbs].
207. See, e.g., Scott Parks, Hanging Out No Longer in New Orleans' Curfew Keeps Kids Off
Streets; Effect on Crime Debated, DALLAS MORNING NEvs, Dec. 7, 1994, at IA (people disagree
about the effectiveness of the curfew in New Orleans); see also Houston Suburbs, supra note 206,
at I1A. "While experts debate the benefits of such laws, officials in [Pasadena, Rosenberg,
Richmond, Humble, and South Houston] have noticed a drop in crime." Id. The number of major
crimes in Pasadena clearly decreased. See id. The Pasadena police captain stated:
"It's been effective in reducing juvenile presence on the streets during the late-night
hours,"... "although it doesn't necessarily show up in juvenile arrest reports."
Mr. Gilmore, the Richmond city manager, said juvenile arrests have increased
since the curfew was implemented in February, but he attributes that as par for the course
with most law enforcement agencies today and believes that it has little to do with the
curfew.
Id. One commentator has noted:
The jury is out as to whether curfew laws really do reduce crime or protect kids. In
Phoenix, violent crimes among 16- and 17-year-olds have decreased since the beginning
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politicians are attempting to protect the youth of its community or to
appease the public to which it must answer.0 8
B.

Domino Curfews and Diversion of Police Resources

When a centrally located city enacts a curfew, many surrounding
communities are forced to enact and enforce curfews of their own. 0 9
These secondary, "domino effect" curfews are enacted by these smaller
'
towns for "self-protection."21
These towns, due to their geographic
location, must enact a juvenile curfew to keep the juveniles out of their
towns, after the normal hangouts in a neighboring city become unavailable because of the city's curfew.2 11
The problem that arises, for both centrally located cities that enact
curfews and peripheral cities that enact domino curfews, is that curfews
do not enforce themselves. Once a curfew is passed, police resources

of the curfew, but they've increased for kids 14 and 15 years old. Results are also
inconclusive in other cities. But whether curfew laws work or fail to work, they are
increasingly appealing to politicians desperate to do something about crime.
Time to Go Home, supra note 181, at 12; see CBS Evening News, at 5 (CBS television broadcast,
Dec. 27, 1995) (transcript on file with the Hofstra Law Review) (curfew opponents in San Diego
dispute statistics indicating a decrease in juvenile crime and claim it makes good kids into criminals);
see also Christopher Lee, Dallas Youth Crime Down Since Curfew, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb.
6, 1996, at 1A (examining the crime rate in Dallas two years after the imposition of the curfew). The
Chief of the Dallas Police Department noted that during curfew hours overall juvenile detentions
have decreased by forty-two percent, detention ofjuveniles for burglaries has decreased by sixty-six
percent, and detention ofjuveniles for narcotics has decreased by sixty percent. See id. The Assistant
Chief of the Dallas Police Department, however, cautioned that it was impossible to determine how
much of the crime reduction was due to the curfew, and noted that the drop in juvenile crime rate
occurred at a time when overall crime also dropped. See id.
208. See generally Time to Go Home, supra note 181, at 12 ("[Curfews] are increasingly
appealing to politicians desperate to do something about crime."); Pressley, supra note 27, at A14
(quoting Joe Cook, executive director of the ACLU of Texas, Northern Region, who stated that
juveniles are a "convenient target" to be scapegoats for the crime problem, and that since juveniles
do not vote they have no power); Ellen Yan, PatchogueDebates Teen Curfew, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
May 8, 1994, at A4. The Mayor of Patchogue, New York, in proposing a curfew for his village,
stated:
"It gives the village a sense of security."... "People are concerned about kids
just hanging out. Very often, they give the impression they are up to no good, whether
they are or not. I don't know if they [curse] at people, they just curse in general. They
got their hats on backwards, and if there are halfa dozen doing nothing, you hear, 'Why
don't you do something about these kids?"'
Id.
209. See Pressley, supra note 27, at A14.
210. See id.; see also William Ruefle, CatchingCurfew Fever, PrrrsBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct.
25, 1995, at A17.
211. See Pressley, supra note 27, at A14.
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must then be diverted to enforce the curfew effectively. Some cities have
formed special patrols, but many argue that these curfews turn police
officers into baby-sitters. 2 ' Other cities are not willing to spend the
extra money2 13 or reassign personnel necessary to enforce the curfew
across the board.214 Many cities have expressed concern that the time
invested into prosecuting curfew violators is not worth the payoff. One
policeman has stated that a curfew "'is effective but not enough to
warrant the program' ....'You are bringing in kids who may or may
not have5 done anything as opposed to targeting high-crime areas for pa21
trol."'

Some cities, in an attempt to get police back onto the streets more
quickly, have established centers in which the police may "drop off"
curfew violators. 1 6 These centers usually are staffed by police, park
and recreation employees, and social services personnel. 2 7 Activities
at the centers vary from reading and playing board games, to sitting
quietly listening to classical music.21 8 Once a violator is brought to the
center, the staff notifies the parent to pick up their child.2 9 When the
parents come, some centers have counselors available to talk to the
juvenile and his or her parent." These programs may help keep police
from baby-sitting, but they cost money, and not all cities, especially the
small towns forced to enact domino curfews, have the resources to fund
them.

212. See Time to Go Home, supra note 181, at 10 (Savannah Mayor Susan Weiner stated that

"[this new role of policeman as babysitter is necessary... because too many parents have lost
control."); see also After Dark, supra note 27, at 25 (a Miami police officer stated: "We don't like

the baby-sitting part."); Denver Cops Rethink Curfew Response to Achieve Speedier Return to
Patrols, LAW ENFORCEmENT NEWS, Aug. 20, 1994, at 7 [hereinafter Denver Cops].
213. See generally Sarah Sturmon, Curfew Should Help, Not Hurt Kids, CINCINNATI POsT, Jan.

18, 1996, at 1OA (recreation officials estimate that they spent $107,860 in 1995 for staff and
equipment at the curfew centers).

214. See Qutb v. City of Dallas, No. 3:91-CV-1310-R, slip op. at 18 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1992),
rev'd sub nom. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2134 (1994)
(the Chief of Police for Dallas testified: "I do not plan to reassign officers from other duties just to
enforce any kind of a curfew ordinance.").
215. Parks, supra note 207, at IA.

216. See Denver Cops, supra note 212, at 7; see also Marc H. Morial, A Solution to Crime"
Juvenile Curfews, SALT LAKE TR.,Jan. 9, 1995, at A7; Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency
Prevention, Curfew: An Answer to JuvenileDelinquency and Victimization?, JUv. JUST. BULL., Apr.
1996, at 1; Parks, supra note 207, at IA.
217. See Denver Cops, supra note 212, at 7.
218. See id.
But see Curfew Penalty: No 77, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at A18.
219. See Denver Cops, supra note 212, at 7.

220. See id
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C. Use of Curfews as a Pretextfor Stops
A pretextual stop occurs when the police, using a legal justification
such as a minor infraction of the law, "make[s] the stop in order to
search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated
serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion
necessary to support a stop.""1 The evil of pretextual stops is the
unlimited power and discretion it gives to police officers to make arrests
and searches based upon minor offenses.' With the use of pretextual
stops an officer, who normally would not pursue a minor infraction,
could pursue the minor infraction in the hopes that she will find evidence
of a greater offense the officer suspects exists but does not have the level
of suspicion necessary to investigate."2 3 Without restricting or abolishing this authority, a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures,
as protected by the Fourth Amendment, will be trampled
4
upon.2

The Supreme Court has recognized two types of pretextual stops,
legal and fabricated pretexts 2 25 A "legal" pretext occurs when the
"government offers a justification that is not the true reason for the
police activity, but that, if the motivation of the officer is not considered,
' 6 A fabricated pretext
legally justifies the activity."2
occurs when "the
government offers a justification that is not the true reason for the police
activity and, in fact, is legally insufficient because it is not supported by
the facts."227 Curfew legislation can result in both of these pretexts
occurring.
First, under a legal pretext, the police can use the curfew as a reason
to approach a juvenile that they suspect is engaged in a serious crime.
The justification for approaching is legitimate, but the officer's actual
motivation is a pretext. If the juvenile is out past the curfew, an arrest
might result in a search and discovery of contraband. The selective

221. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988). The court gave what it
called a "classic example" of a pretextual stop: "when an officer stops a driver for a minor traffic
violation in order to investigate a hunch that the driver is engaged in illegal drug activity." Id.
222. See Edwin J. Butterfoss, Solving the PretextPuzzle: The Importance of UlteriorMotives
and Fabricationsin the Supreme Court'sFourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 KY. L.J. 1, 59

(1990-91).
223. See Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517.
224. See Butterfoss, supra note 222, at 59-60.

225. See id. at 5.
226. Id. at 6.
227. Id.
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enforcement of the curfew to search particular people can result in
discrimination. The police could essentially use the curfew as a pretext
to search someone they believe is in possession of contraband. For a
curfew to be effective, the offending juveniles must be taken into
custody, but the courts must be wary of the pretextual use of curfew
arrests and selective enforcement of the curfew.
The fabricated pretextual use of a curfew occurs when the police
stop someone who is outside the parameters of the curfew but uses the
curfew as the basis for the stop. Curfews draw a distinction between two
age groups and police are forced to look at someone and decide if they
are in violation of the curfew. If the police believe the person is age sixteen or under, they can then approach, ask for identification, and even
effect an arrest if the person does not provide sufficient identification.
With the arrest, a police officer may search the individual, which may
produce contraband. The discretion left to the police to stop anyone they
believe might be under the statutory curfew age leads to the concern that
police will abuse their power and make improper pretextual stops and
arrests. Courts have reviewed cases where the police have stopped,
searched, and even arrested an individual believing that he or she was
under the curfew age. 8 The consensus of the courts is that the stopping of "youthful-looking" adults does not unconstitutionally interfere
with an individual's right to freedom of movement since the youthful
appearance provides the reasonable basis for the stop as required by
Terry v. Ohio.229 The problem that arises is that courts must now
review and make sure that the person arrested actually looks under the
proscribed age. As a result, courts must watch for police who are using
the curfew as an excuse to stop all young-looking people just to see what
the stop produces.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Curfews have been on the books since William the Conqueror. Over
the years, the use of juvenile curfews has been in waves. Recently, the
rise in juvenile crime has forced many politicians to turn to curfews to
control crime. As a result, the debate on the effectiveness of juvenile

228. See, e.g., Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599, 608 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), vacated on
other grounds, 660 A.2d 447, (Md. 1995); People v. Smith, 276 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979);
City of Richmond Hts. v. Marando, 1992 WL 114598 (Ohio Ct. App. May 28, 1992); City of Akron
v. Fair, 646 N.E.2d 1205 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1994).
229. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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curfews has been rekindled, leading to the same discussion that occurred
100 years ago."' This debate has recently culminated in the Qutb
ruling, where the Fifth Circuit held that the curfew ordinance in the city
of Dallas, Texas was constitutional. After the Qutb decision, cities across
the country enacted curfew ordinances mirroring the Dallas curfew
ordinance.
This "curfew-copying" is illustrated in Hutchins v. District of
Columbia.2 3' In Hutchins, a group of minors, parents, and private
businesses challenged the constitutionality of ajuvenile curfew ordinance
that the District of Columbia had copied "wholesale [from] the Dallas,
Texas, juvenile ordinance that withstood scrutiny in Qutb.,,232 The
district court in Washington, D.C. found, after applying the Bellotti
factors, that there were no "legitimate grounds for treating minors'
fundamental right to free movement differently from those of
adults. 233 The district court found that the ordinance was unconstitutional, on the grounds that the statistics offered by the District of
Columbia "d[id] not demonstrate that the curfew law is narrowly tailored
'2 34
to support the District's compelling interest in responding to crime.
The Hutchins decision demonstrates that the Qutb ruling is not as
reliable as some cities may have originally perceived. Those cities that
are quick to adopt the Dallas ordinance's language should review the
problems with the Qutb court's rationale and tread carefully before
restricting their juveniles.
Brian J. Lester*

230. As one commentator noted 100 years ago:
Do the advocates of curfew realize that the mere fact of being arrested makes a boy lose
caste among the better class of his associates? Everyone knows the power of suggestion.
Arrest a boy and call him a lawbreaker, and he is just one step nearer to becoming one
in fact. And yet there is nothing intrinsically wrong in playing on the streets. Nature
places the child there for want of better conditions in which to exercise his imagination
and his muscles; and then we make a law which, in obeying nature, he must break. That
done, we propose sending him to some institution where his associates will be youthful
thieves and gamblers; even if sent to the 'Truant Home,' it would be away from the very
parents and home the ordinance was erected to keep him with.
Buck, supra note 19, at 384.
231. 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996).
232. Id. at 678.

233. Id. at 674.
234. Id. at 679.

* The Author expresses his thanks to Professor J. Herbie DiFonzo, Hofstra University School
of Law, for his assistance and guidance in the writing of this Comment.
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APPENDIX

ORDINANCE NO. 21309
An ordinance amending Section 31-33, "Curfew Hours for Minors," of
CHAPTER 3 1, "OFFENSES-MISCELLANEOUS," of the Dallas City
Code, as amended; repealing Section 2 of Ordinance No. 20966;
defining terms; creating offenses for minors, parents and guardians of
minors, and business establishments violating curfew regulations;
providing defenses; providing for enforcement by the police department; providing for waiver by the municipal court of jurisdiction over
a minor when required under the Texas Family Code; providing for

review of this ordinance in lieu of Ordinance No. 20966 within six
months after the date of initial enforcement; providing a penalty not to
exceed $500; providing a saving clause; providing a severability clause;
and providing an effective date.
WHEREAS, the city council has determined that there has been
an increase in juvenile violence, juvenile gang activity, and crime by
persons under the age of 17 in the city of Dallas; and
WHEREAS, persons under the age of 17 are particularly susceptible by their lack of maturity and experience to participate in unlawful
and gang-related activities and to be victims of older perpetrators of
crime; and
WHEREAS, the city of Dallas has an obligation to provide for the
protection of minors from each other and from other persons, for the
enforcement of parental control over and responsibility for children, for
the protection of the general public, and for the reduction of the
incidence of juvenile criminal activities; and
WHEREAS, a curfew for those under the age of 17 will be in the
interest of the public health, safety, and general welfare and will help
to attain the foregoing objectives and to diminish the undesirable
impact of such conduct on the citizens of the city of Dallas; Now,
Therefore,
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY
OF DALLAS:
SECTION 1. That Section 31-33, "Curfew Hours for Minors," of
CHAPTER 31, "OFFENSES-MISCELLANEOUS," of the Dallas City
Code, as amended, is amended to read as follows:
SEC. 31-33. CURFEW HOURS FOR MINORS.
(a) Definitions. In this section:
(1) CURFEW HOURS means:
(A) 11:00 p.m. on any Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or
Thursday until 6:00 a.m. of the following day; and
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(B) 12:01 a.m. until 6:00 a.m. on any Saturday or Sunday.
(2) EMERGENCY means an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action. The term
includes, but is not limited to, a fire, a natural disaster, or automobile
accident, or any situation requiring immediate action to prevent serious
bodily injury or loss of life.
(3) ESTABLISHMENT means any privately-owned place of
business operated for a profit to which the public is invited, including
but not limited to any place of amusement or entertainment.
(4) GUARDIAN means:
(A) a person who, under court order, is the guardian of the person
of a minor; or
(B) a public or private agency with whom a minor has been
placed by a court.
(5) MINOR means any person under 17 years of age.
(6) OPERATOR means any individual, firm, association, partnership, or corporation operating, managing, or conducting any establishment. The term includes the members or partners of an association
or partnership and the officers of a corporation.
(7) PARENT means a person who is:
(A) a natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent of another
person; or
(B) at least 18 years of age and authorized by a parent or guardian
to have the care and custody of a minor.
(8) PUBLIC PLACE means any place to which the public or a
substantial group of the public has access and includes, but is not
limited to, streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops.
(9) REMAIN means to:
(A) linger or stay; or
(B) fail to leave premises when requested to do so by a police
officer or the owner, operator, or other person in control of the
premises.
(10) SERIOUS BODILY INJURY means bodily injury that
creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious
permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.

(b) Offenses.
(1) A minor commits an offense if he remains in any public place
or on the premises of any establishment within the city during curfew
hours.
(2) a parent or guardian of a minor commits an offense if he
knowingly permits, or by insufficient control allows, the minor to
remain in any public place or on the premises of any establishment
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within the city during curfew hours.
(3) The owner, operator, or any employee of an establishment
commits an offense if he knowingly allows a minor to remain upon the
premises of the establishment during the curfew hours.
(c) Defenses.
(1) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (b) that the
minor was:
(A) accompanied by the minor's parent or guardian;
(B) on an errand at the direction of the minor's parent or guardian,
without any detour or stop;
(C) in a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel;
(D) engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning
home from an employment activity, without any detour or stop;
(E)involved in an emergency;
(F) on the sidewalk abutting the minor's residence or abutting the
residence of a next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to
the police department about the minor's presence;
(G) attending an official school, religious, or other recreational
activity supervised by adults and sponsored by the city of Dallas, a
civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for
the minor, or going to or returning home from, without any detour or
stop, an official school, religious, or other recreational activity
supervised by adults and sponsored by the city of Dallas, a civic
organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the
minor,
(H) exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United
States Constitution, such as the free exercise of religion, freedom of
speech, and the right of assembly; or
(1) married or had been married or had disabilities of minority
removed in accordance with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code.
(2) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (b)(3) that the
owner, operator, or employee of an establishment promptly notified the
police department that a minor was present on the premises of the
establishment during curfew hours and refused to leave.
(d) Enforcement.

Before taking any enforcement action under this section, a police
officer shall ask the apparent offender's age and reason for being in the
public place. The officer shall not issue a citation or make an arrest
under this section unless the officer reasonably believes that an offense
has occurred and that, based on any response and other circumstances,
no defense in Subsection (c) is present.
(e) Penalties.

(1) A person who violates a provision of this chapter is guilty of
a separate offense for each day or part of a day during which the
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violation is committed, continued, or permitted. Each offense, upon
conviction, is punishable by a fine not to exceed $500.
(2) When required by Section 51.08 of the Texas Family Code,
as amended, the municipal court shall waive original jurisdiction over
a minor who violates Subsection (b)(1) of this section and shall refer
the minor to juvenile court.
SECTION 2. That Section 2 of Ordinance No. 20966, passed by
the city council on June 12, 1991, is repealed.
SECTION 3. That within six months after the initial enforcement
of this ordinance, the city manager shall review this ordinance and
report and make recommendations to the city council concerning the
effectiveness of and the continuing need for the ordinance. The city
manager's report shall specifically include the following information:
(A) the practicality of enforcing the ordinance and any problems
with enforcement identified by the police department;
(B) the impact of the ordinance on crime statistics;
(C) the number of persons successfully prosecuted for a violation
of the ordinance; and
(D) the city's net cost of enforcing the ordinance.
SECTION 4. That CHAPTER 31 of the Dallas City Code, as
amended, shall remain in full force and effect, save and except as
amended by this ordinance.
SECTION 5. That the terms and provisions of this ordinance are
severable and are governed by Section 1-4 of CHAPTER 1 of the
Dallas City Code, as amended.
SECTION 6. That this ordinance shall take effect immediately
from and after its passage and publication in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the City of Dallas, and it is accordingly so
ordained.1

1. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496-99 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting DALLAS, TEX. CODE § 31-33
(1992) (amending DALLAS, TEx. CODE § 31-33 (1991))), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
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